Determined by Desire: Resolving The Tension of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom

This article originated as a theology paper written for the purpose of my studies with The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Spring 2024.

The tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom has been discussed and debated throughout history. Countless philosophers and theologians have pondered how we can have free will, and be held morally responsible for our decisions, if God is sovereign over every aspect of life. Over the last two millennia, Christians have generally responded to this problem by relying on two different understandings of human freedom: libertarian and compatibilist.[1]

This paper explores the true nature of free will by assessing these two historic views. Based on biblical and theological evidence, it argues that human decisions are freely made when they are determined by that person’s own desires. In this way, it shows that compatibilism is the biblical position, resolving the tension with God’s sovereignty and enabling moral responsibility.

This paper begins by outlining the libertarian view of free will, describing three ways that its proponents try to reconcile it with divine sovereignty: (1) biblical mystery, (2) non-causal control, and (3) variants of foreknowledge. It then defines the compatibilist position, arguing for this view by relying on (1) biblical exegesis, and (2) theological reasoning. It goes on to address the two main objections to compatibilism: (1) divine goodness, and (2) human responsibility. It then concludes by drawing some theological and pastoral implications for Christians today.

Libertarian Freedom

This paper will now briefly define a libertarian understanding of free will. It will then explain how different libertarians defend this view from the implications of divine sovereignty.

Defining Libertarian Freedom

Libertarianism holds “for an action to be truly free it must have been really possible, with all the antecedent conditions remaining exactly the same, for the agent to have chosen differently.”[2] This definition is commonly split in two: (1) the person must have been able to decide differently, and (2) the decision must originate within them, rather than been determined externally.[3] This is why it has been called the freedom of contrary choice or self-determination.[4]

It is widely accepted that this view is “almost universal” in our culture today.[5] This is its most basic supporting argument, purportedly demonstrating that it is “the most common and natural understanding of freedom.”[6] It describes the “experience of choice” we all seem to have, for when we decide whether to read a book or not, it often seems like we can take either option.[7]

By way of biblical support, John Laing admits that there is no “proof text stating that libertarianism is the correct view.”[8] However, proponents argue that it is the logical and natural implication of biblical commands. For example, individuals are often asked to choose between two options (Deut 30:15; Josh 24:15; 1 Kgs 18:21; Phil 1:21–22).[9] Therefore, there is clearly an “expectation that they really can choose between them.”[10] Libertarianism can also be supported by 1 Corinthians 10:13, which suggests that we are always able to choose an alternative to sin.[11]

Many other arguments are given for libertarianism, including that self-determination is a direct result of humanity being made in God’s image.[12] However, the most common argument in both philosophy and theology is that without such freedom, humans cannot be responsible for their actions. It is argued that if we are unable to decide differently, we are under coercion, and so no longer morally accountable for our choices.[13] As explored further below, it is asserted that this not only removes human responsibility, but it makes God the cause of all evil in the world.

Defending Libertarian Freedom

As this paper demonstrates below, Scripture asserts God’s sovereignty over all of life, including human decisions. Libertarians try to reconcile this with their understanding of free will by appealing to (1) biblical mystery, (2) non-causal control, and (3) variants of foreknowledge.

(1) Biblical Mystery. When addressing divine sovereignty and human responsibility in Romans 9:19, Paul suggests it is inappropriate to probe such matters. As a result, some see it as one example of a biblical mystery, “something that is not contrary to reason, but which goes beyond reason.”[14] Therefore, we should believe both truths without trying to harmonize them.[15]

(2) Non-causal Control. Many libertarians believe in “divine self-limitation.”[16] Jack Cottrell argues that although God can directly control human decisions, he usually lets us make our own choices. Nevertheless, each situation still results in God’s desired end.[17] Laing suggests this is because God works indirectly, influencing our minds and arranging our circumstances. In this way, God is indirectly in control without being “causally determinative”, as these indirect influences are always resistible (Acts 7:51).[18] This means that divine sovereignty is maintained, but humans make their own free choices and are morally responsible for them.[19] Similarly, John Lennox argues that God sovereignly chose to give libertarian freedom to humans, decreeing that we would be “free moral beings who can ourselves decide to do good or evil.”[20] This means that God is responsible for bestowing freedom, while humans are responsible for behaving with it.[21]

(3) Variants of Foreknowledge. The Bible teaches that God has infallible knowledge of the future (Is 40–48; 1 John 3:20). However, if God knows what we will do, how can we make a different decision? Some libertarians respond by limiting foreknowledge to a knowledge of the free choices that humans will make in the future. Therefore, rather than determining our choices, our decisions determine divine knowledge.[22] Cottrell suggests this is how God maintains control, preparing the perfect response to us in advance.[23] Alternatively, following Boethius and Aquinas, some hold divine knowledge is nontemporal, as God is above time. Norman Geisler explains, what humans “will choose is present to God in his eternal NOW. . . God does not foreknow it; he simply knows it.”[24] Another approach is based on middle knowledge, reasoning that God knows the future because he knows what each human would choose in every possible circumstance.[25] However, given the difficulty foreknowledge causes, some libertarians adopt open theism, which radically redefines the doctrine of God.[26] It holds future free decisions to be unknowable, as they must be undetermined until realization. As a result, God cannot know the future with certainty.[27]

Compatibilist Freedom

Having outlined libertarianism, this paper now describes and defends the compatibilist position. Compatibilism teaches that people act freely if they “voluntarily choose what they most want to choose.”[28] As a result, our decisions are free if they are determined by our own desires. It is argued that this position is supported by: (1) biblical exegesis, and (2) theological reasoning.

(1) Biblical Exegesis

Divine Sovereignty. Scripture declares that God is sovereign over human decisions in principle (Prov 16:1, 9; 19:21; 21:1; Jas 4:15) and demonstrates it in practice (Exod 9:13–17; 1 Sam 10:9; Jer 51:1; Ezra 1:1; Acts 16:14). There is no doubt that a human heart is “a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever he will” (Prov 21:1).[29] God determines all things (Dan 4:35; Rom 8:28; Eph 1:11), even sinful human decisions (Hab 1:5–17; Acts 2:23).

Dual Agency. This “sovereign dictation of the heart abrogates neither man’s freedom (i.e., voluntary actions) nor his responsibility.”[30] Instead, Scripture gives a dual explanation for every event, with two wills (i.e. divine and human) working together without loss of freedom or culpability. In the Old Testament, Joseph’s enslavement is attributed to both divine and human intentions (Gen 50:20). In the New Testament, the cross is the premier example of the harmony between divine sovereignty and human responsibility (Acts 2:23; 4:27–28). While Jesus’ death was clearly “determined” beforehand, Judas was still responsible for his decision (Luke 22:22). Such scenarios can only be explained by adopting a compatibilist understanding of free will.[31]

Decisions always follow desires. Scott Christensen explains, “People do not have the power of contrary choice. They always choose only what they most want to do.”[32] This is explicit in the teaching that everything we do flows from the heart (Prov 4:23; Matt 15:18–19). Decisions cannot be detached from desires, as our desires determine our decisions (Jas 1:14–15; 4:1–3). From such passages, Jonathan Edwards concluded that our decisions are “always determined by the strongest motive.”[33] We are not free to do whatever we want to do, but what we want to do.[34]

Desires are from natures. The Bible also explains that what we want is a direct result of who we are, as our desires come from our natures.[35] As Jesus taught, good trees produce good fruit and bad trees produce bad fruit (Matt 7:15–20; 12:33–35; Luke 6:45). Due to sinful natures, our desires are depraved and draw us into evil (Gen 6:5; Jer 13:23; Rom 8:7–8). For this reason, even when humans act freely, they are voluntary slaves.[36] We are enslaved to either our sinful or new natures (John 8:34; Rom 6:20). The reason that it intuitively seems like we make choices ourselves is because we do. However, we always do so according to the strongest motive arising from our natures. Such decisions determined by our desires are free. This compatibilist “freedom is simply the ability to be the person you are, nothing more complex or abstruse than that.”[37]

(2) Theological Reasoning

Divine Omniscience. As shown above, libertarian free will is hard to reconcile with divine omniscience. However, the various explanations that libertarians suggest are insufficient. If our decisions determine divine knowledge, we teach God and deny aseity and immutability.[38] If his knowledge is outside of time, it is still expressed within time through prophecies, and this will determine future human decisions.[39] Middle knowledge does not remove the reality that in the world God chose to create, we are still unable to decide differently.[40] Open theism overturns the orthodox doctrines of divine immutability, aseity, eternality, and impassibility.[41] As Martin Luther declared, “This bombshell knocks [libertarian] ‘free will’ flat, and utterly shatters it.”[42]

Divine Impeccability. Edwards believed divine impeccability to be enough to “clearly and absolutely determine the controversy”.[43] In summary, as God cannot choose to sin, he is also necessitated by his own nature.[44]This does not remove his freedom or mean his holiness is not to be praised. This becomes even more problematic for libertarians when applied to Jesus as a man. John Frame explains that Jesus was physically and mentally able to sin, but morally incapable of sin.[45] This moral inability does not remove his freedom or undermine Jesus’ praiseworthiness. He always did the will of his Father, because he always desired to do it. Therefore, God is only free in a compatibilist sense, and Jesus, as the perfect human, did not have libertarian free will.

Doctrine of Scripture. Inerrancy and inspiration are undermined by libertarianism, as both usually require human authors to have been unable to write anything other than what God determined.[46] Only compatibilism explains how each word intended by the human authors could freely flow from their own motives, while still mirroring the exact words intended by God.[47]

Christian Perseverance. According to libertarianism, for a Christian to follow Jesus freely, they must be able to turn away from him. Logically, if God’s initial work in our lives is resistible, then our growth in holiness and our perseverance in faith must also reversable. As a result, it is unsurprising that Christian traditions that have embraced libertarianism, such as Arminianism, have also denied the eternal security of believers (John 6:39; 10:28; Phil 1:6).

Christian Glorification. Libertarians also face “the dilemma of heavenly freedom.”[48] According to libertarianism, for genuine righteousness to exist, there must always be the option for the agent to choose evil instead. However, this will not be possible in the new heavens and the new earth (2 Peter 3:13; Rev 21–22).[49] In a glorified state, Christians will not be able to sin. In this way, “the highest state of human existence will be a state without libertarian freedom.”[50] As Christensen concludes, “the existence of heaven decisively bankrupts libertarianism.”[51]

Two Key Objections

This paper now briefly addresses two of the strongest objections often made against a compatibilist understanding of free will: (1) divine goodness, and (2) human responsibility.

(1) Divine Goodness

Libertarians believe their view of freedom protects God’s goodness.[52] If God controls human decisions, they claim that he becomes the author of evil.[53] Instead, libertarians see “evil as the undesirable but unavoidable result of human choice over which God has decided not to be in total control.”[54] This is called the “free will defense” to the problem of evil.[55] Why then does God give us free will? C. S. Lewis answers, “Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having.”[56] Plantinga asserts you cannot have “a world containing moral good but not moral evil.”[57] Others state “only love ground in libertarian freedom is true love.”[58] Consequently, evil is “a price worth paying.”[59]

While such arguments are common, they are based on false premises. First, both love and moral good can exist without libertarian freedom. The new creation will have goodness but no moral evil. As the great example of love, God does not have such freedom (1 John 4:16). As Thaddeus Williams explains, the Father is not able to hate the Son, but loves him in a way that is necessitated by their nature.[60] Secondly, we can respond to the problem of evil without relying on libertarianism. For example, greater good defenses provide other “morally sufficient” reasons for evil, chiefly God’s glory in redemption through Jesus.[61] As Laing admits, compatibilism “can offer a plausible and biblically grounded theodicy” without resorting to the free will defense.[62]

(2) Human Responsibility

Libertarians also see compatibilist freedom as insufficient for moral responsibility. If an agent cannot act otherwise, libertarians argue he cannot be held culpable for failing to do so.[63] Stephen Holmes admits “the logic is so common as to seem unassailable.”[64] For this reason, Geisler concludes “moral determinism makes God immoral and makes humans amoral.”[65]

While this logic seems unassailable, it is fundamentally flawed. All views claim to be the “kind of freedom–whatever it may be–required for genuine moral responsibility.”[66] However, compatibilists can prove this through philosophical reasoning. This shows that different kinds of inability have different effects on moral responsibility, and that culpability is not ultimately tied to our ability to do otherwise, but our intentions and natures.[67] This is what Scripture teaches, for humans are culpable for intentions (Gen 6:5; 1 Sam 16:7; Prov 16:2, 21; Jere 17:10; Acts 8:22).[68] While God makes and uses the wicked for evil, they are responsible and will not go unpunished (Prov 16:4–5; Isa 10:5–15; Hab 1–2; Luke 22:22). In the same way, while Jesus could not sin, he is still responsible for his obedience and righteous (Rom 5:19). The Bible does not ground our responsibility in libertarian free will. Rather, Jesus declares that humans are responsible for their natures. A bad tree can only produce bad fruit, and yet it is still held responsible and burned as a result (Matt 7:15–19).[69] We are not just accountable for what we choose, but for who we are. As Holmes points out, “the fact that ‘I cannot do so’ is precisely what makes me responsible.”[70]

Conclusion

This paper has explored the nature of free will by assessing two historic views from a biblical and theological perspective. It has demonstrated that compatibilism is the biblical view, and that our decisions are freely made when they are determined by our own desires. It has also shown how this resolves the tension with God’s sovereignty and enables true moral culpability.  

Given that divine sovereignty and human freedom are set side by side throughout the Bible (Gen 50:20; Acts 13:48; 14:1; Rom 9:16; 10:14; Phil 2:12–13), it is surprising that there is almost no explicit acknowledgement of the alleged tension between them. Frame suggests this is because biblical authors have different philosophical presuppositions, including a compatibilist view of human freedom.[71] If we approach these texts from another perspective, including that of libertarianism, we can hardly be surprised if we struggle to make sense of what they mean.

This paper has shown that if libertarian free will is established, and taken to its logical conclusion, then it will have a significant impact on a wide range of important theological topics, including sin, grace, election, redemption, conversion, perseverance, the work of the Holy Spirit, the nature of faith, the eternal state, the doctrine of God, and the person and work of Jesus Christ. In this way, we can see the extent of “the threat it poses to evangelical orthodoxy.”[72]However, libertarianism is not just a theological and philosophical issue. It also has practical and pastoral implications for matters such as prayer, assurance, suffering and evangelism. As a result, it is crucial that Christians think very carefully about the true nature of free will, always examining their most basic presuppositions and premonitions about human freedom in light of Scripture.

[1] Philosophy has been dominated by two questions: (1) Is determinism true? (2) Is free will compatible with it? This has led to a variety of positions, including determinism, skepticism, incompatibilism, and revisionism. Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5. The theological discussion within Christianity focuses on libertarianism and compatibilism. Both sides agree there is no third way in Christian theology. See Paul Helm, Reforming Free Will (Fearn, Scotland: Christian Focus, 2020), 239. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 75. 

[2] Michael L. Peterson, et al., Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013),161. This is an historic position, with most of the early church holding it until the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius. See John Frame, The Doctrine of God, vol. 2 of A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2002), 138. It is helpfully described and defended by John Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” in Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique, ed. David L. Allen and Steve W. Lemke (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2022), 389–432. Also Jack Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, vol. 2 of The Doctrine of God (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1984). William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983). A more polemic, but less theological, treatment of free will can be found in John C. Lennox, Determined to Believe? (London: Monarch Books, 2017).

[3] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 390.

[4] It is also labelled power of alternate possibilities and liberty of indifference. Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 176. Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 2001), 127. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 29.

[5] Stephen R. Holmes, Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 2002), 87. See also Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 409. Scott Christensen, What about Free Will? Reconciling Our Choices with God’s Sovereignty(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2016), 93.

[6] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 409.

[7] Hasker, Metaphysics, 45.

[8] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 394. Frame points out it is primarily a philosophical idea that relies on various philosophical assumptions about causation and sovereignty. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 140.

[9] Norman Geisler, “God knows all things,” in Four Views of Divine Sovereignty & Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 64.

[10] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 397.

[11] Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 156.

[12] The libertarian Laing admits this is often asserted but rarely explained. Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 412. For example, Lennox simply asserts that being made in God’s image means that we have “a real capacity to act independently of his direct control.” Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 55.

[13] Hasker, Metaphysics, 46. Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 26.

[14] Geisler, “God knows all things,” 78.

[15] This position was popularised through the work of J. I. Packer, who labelled the tension an antinomy that has only the appearance of contradiction but cannot be reconciled by reason. J. I. Packer, Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008), 24. See Christensen, What about Free Will?, xii.

[16] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 402. Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 65.

[17] Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 199.

[18] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 403.

[19] Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 199–208.

[20] Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 65.

[21] Geisler, “God knows all things,” 79.

[22] Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 226. Geisler, “God knows all things,” 74.

[23] Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 208.

[24] Geisler, “God knows all things,” 73. Hasker, Metaphysics, 54.

[25] William L. Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Bloomington, MN: Bethany, 1989), 141–164.

[26] Hasker, Metaphysics, 53. R. C. Sproul, Willing to Believe (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 143.

[27] Open theists assign such importance to libertarianism, they label the view “free will theism”. Richard Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” in Pinnock, The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 121–139.

[28] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 6. See also John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001), 290. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Harry S. Stout and Paul Ramsey, vol. 1. of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (London: Yale University Press, 2009), 14.

[29] Even Cottrell admits there are many examples of direct control (Num 24; 1 Sam 19:24; Prov 21:1), where God “caused people to do things they did not intend.” Cottrell, What the Bible says about God the Ruler, 195.

[30] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 119.

[31] There are countless such examples of divine sovereignty and human responsibility in Scripture (Lev 20:7–8; Isa 10:5–19; Jonah 1:15; 2:3; 1 Cor 15:10; Phil 2:12–13; Col 1:29). Christensen, What about Free Will?, 77.

[32] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 146.

[33] Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 163. Frame clarifies we always act according to our strongest desire in the moment of decision, rather than always following our highest general motive. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 137.

[34] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 137.

[35] Christensen summarizes: (1) we choose what we want, (2) we want what we desire most, and (3) our desires are determined by our nature. Christensen, What about Free Will?, 177. Philosophy has likewise noted that the nature or structure of our will can have a limiting effect on us. Kane, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 14.

[36] Sproul, Willing to Believe, 108. For us to desire holiness, God give us new natures with new desires (Ps 51:10; Jer 31:33; Ezek 11:19–20). These new desires determine our decisions in the same way as sinful ones do.

[37] Holmes, Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology, 105.

[38] Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation, vol. 2, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 2:201.

[39] This argument from prophecy was crucial for Edwards. Holmes summarizes, “Certain future events will inevitably happen, because God has given prophecies that they will happen. . . . to the extent these depend on free human choices. . . those choices form a class of human decisions that are freely made, yet necessary. Thus freedom is not incompatible with necessity.” Holmes, Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology, 99.

[40] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 504.

[41] John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2001), 161–90.

[42] Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer (London: James Clark, 1957), 80.

[43] Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 289.

[44] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 178.

[45] Such distinctions are crucial, as the same action can be possible and impossible. For example, it was possible to break Jesus’ bones physically, but impossible due to prophecy. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 132–34. Laing’s response to this is both concerning and inconsistent, see Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 417.

[46] Stephen Wellum, “The Inerrancy of Scripture,” in Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity, ed. John Piper, et al. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2003), 237–73.

[47] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 107.

[48] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 426.

[49] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 224. As with impeccability, Laing’s response to glorification is concerning as he suggests we may be able to sin in heaven. See Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 426.

[50] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 141.

[51] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 225.

[52] Olson, Arminian Theology, 98.

[53] This is “the most serious implication of theistic determinism.” Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 68.

[54] Peterson, Reason & Religious Belief, 163.

[55] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 29.

[56] C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (London: Harper Collins, 2012), 48.

[57] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 55–57.

[58] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 414. Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 29.

[59] Lewis, Mere Christianity, 48.

[60] Thaddeus J. Williams, Love, Freedom, and Evil: Does Authentic Love Require Free Will? (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 41–42. See also Christensen, What about Free Will?, 35.

[61] Stephen Wellum, Systematic Theology: From Canon to Concept (Brentwood, TN: B&H Academic, 2024), 921. See also responses from Frame, The Doctrine of God, 160–82. Christensen, What about Free Will?, 68.

[62] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 422.

[63] Lennox, Determined to Believe?, 145. Hasker, Metaphysics, 46.

[64] Holmes, Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology, 87.

[65] Geisler, “God knows all things,” 75.

[66] Kane, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 16.

[67] Laing, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” 423. Sam Storms provides a helpful example of natural and moral inability resulting in different culpability. For if I fail to rescue a drowning child because I am unable to physically swim, I should not be held liable. However, if I do so because I am not able to morally care, then I am certainly culpable for failing to act. Sam Storms, “The Will: Fettered Yet Free,” in A God Entranced Vision of All Things: The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards, ed. John Piper and Justin Taylor (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004), 209.

[68] Christensen, What about Free Will?, 41. Frame, The Doctrine of God, 127.

[69] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 120.

[70] Holmes, Listening to the Past: The Place of Tradition in Theology, 89.

[71] Frame, The Doctrine of God, 120.

[72] Storms, “The Will: Fettered Yet Free,” 109.