Foreknown and Free: The Depth of Divine Omniscience and its Implications for Human Freedom

This article originated as a theology paper written for the purpose of my studies with The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Winter 2023.

“Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!” (ESV) In Romans 11:33, Paul expresses his delight in the doctrine of God’s omniscience. Throughout history, all Christian traditions have generally affirmed that God has “knowledge of all truths.”[1] However, despite this, the true depth of divine omniscience is contested. This is especially true of divine foreknowledge, God’s knowledge of the future, due to implications of this for human freedom.

This paper will consider the nature of divine foreknowledge of free human actions. By assessing historic views of foreknowledge in light of Scripture, it argues that God knows the free actions of humans in the future because he determines every aspect of the future. As a result, it shows the Reformed view of exhaustive foreknowledge best represents the teaching of Scripture.

This paper begins by outlining three views of foreknowledge: (1) Arminian cognitive knowledge, (2) Molinist middle knowledge, and (3) Socinian open knowledge. It then describes and defends the Reformed position of exhaustive foreknowledge from a biblical and theological perspective. It demonstrates that God’s knowledge (1) comprehends free human actions in the future because (2) God controls the future. It addresses two objections to this view: (1) human freedom, and (2) divine flexibility. The paper then concludes by drawing implications for today.

Three Historic Views of Foreknowledge

This paper will now introduce three historic views of foreknowledge: (1) Arminian cognitive knowledge, (2) Molinist middle knowledge, and (3) Socinian open knowledge.

(1) Arminian Cognitive Knowledge

In the sixteenth century, Jacobus Arminius developed a view of divine foreknowledge that differed from that of John Calvin and his Reformed followers. The Arminian position is that God’s foreknowledge is “cognition of something before it actually happens or exists in history.”[2] However, this “foreknowledge is not foredetermination. The fact God foreknows what a choice will be does not mean he caused it. He simply knew in advance what would be freely decided.”[3]

This foreknowledge does not cause or coerce human choices. Instead, it is advanced cognition of them. As Arminius himself reasoned, “a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet to come to pass.”[4] As a result, it is human freedom that determines God’s foreknowledge, rather than the other way around.[5] It is commonly suggested that just as knowledge of the past does not cause it to happen, knowledge of the future need not cause it to occur either. In the same way as we can look back in time to see what happened in the past, God looks forward to see what will happen in the future.[6]  

It is argued that this not only protects human freedom, but it also best represents the Bible’s teaching on the topic. For example, Jack Cottrell points out that divine foreknowledge is distinct from, and provides the basis for, predestination in Romans 8:29. Similarly, 1 Peter 1:2 teaches that Christians were “chosen according to the foreknowledge of God the Father.” [7] For this reason, Arminius taught that God’s decree to save an individual is based on his cognitive foreknowledge of whether that individual will freely choose to repent and believe in the future.[8]

(2) Molinist Middle Knowledge

Like Jacobus Arminius, Luis Molina developed his position in the sixteenth century in response to a Reformed view. Following Thomas Aquinas, it is generally accepted that God has both “necessary” and “free” knowledge.[9]Necessary knowledge is what possibly could happen in history. Free knowledge is what actually does happen. Molina developed this distinction, arguing God not only knows what could possibly happen (necessary knowledge) and what does actually happen (free knowledge), but what would hypothetically happen if a person exercised free choice in an unlimited number of situations. He called this God’s “middle” knowledge, for it is logically located between necessary and free knowledge.[10] Molina held that God uses middle knowledge to decide what to do in history, and so it logically causes his free knowledge of what happens.

William Lane Craig argues Molinism is the best way to reconcile foreknowledge with human freedom.[11] It allows God to determine the course of history by realizing the hypothetical world in which he knows, through middle knowledge, that humans will freely choose the course he desires. As a result, God achieves his “ultimate purposes through free creaturely decisions.” [12]

In Scripture, God clearly has counterfactual knowledge: he knew Keilah would betray David (1 Sam 23:6–10), he told Zedekiah what would happen if he surrendered (Jer 38:17–18), and Jonah’s prophecy for Nineveh was conditional (3:1–10). Jesus also displays counterfactual knowledge (Matt 16:24; John 18:36). Molinists admit that we are not explicitly told that “God’s counterfactual knowledge is possessed logically prior to his creative decree.”[13] However, they suggest this is the best way to reconcile the explicit truths of foreknowledge and human freedom.

(3) Socinian Open Knowledge

This third view is often called “open theism.” In response to the Reformed position, it protects human freedom by arguing that free choices are outside knowable reality.[14] The issue is not whether God knows future free decisions, but whether such decisions are even knowable.[15] Clark Pinnock argues that as the future does not yet exist, and decisions in it are undecided, it cannot be infallibly known. For if decisions are infallibly known in advance, they are not free.[16] Therefore, there is an open aspect to divine knowledge, as God cannot know what humans have not yet decided. As a result, omniscience is to be understood in the same way as the “generally accepted” view of omnipotence.[17] Just as omnipotence is not the ability to do anything, but only what is logically possible, it is argued omniscience only includes what is logically knowable.

This view accepts the Bible describes some aspects of the future as certain. However, Gregory Boyd argues we must not take the fact that “some of the future is settled as evidence that all the future is settled.”[18] Further, as explored below, there is a motif of a dynamic relationship between God and humanity in Scripture, with God changing in response to free human choices.[19] It is argued that this is essential for a God of love, and it is only possible with open knowledge.[20]

When open theism appeared in the 1980s, it was heralded as a new perspective that was superior to more traditional views. However, Lelio and Fausto Socinus advanced similar arguments in the sixteenth century.[21] Reacting to the Reformed view, Socinians also argued that free future decisions are unknowable and likened this to the limitations of divine omnipotence.[22]

The Reformed View of Foreknowledge

Having outlined three views of foreknowledge, this paper now describes and defends the Reformed position. As in other views, omniscience is generally defined as “possession of all knowledge.”[23] However, more specifically, it argues that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of free human actions. This knowledge (1) comprehends all free actions in the future because (2) God controls the future. This paper demonstrates this from a biblical and theological perspective.

(1) The Scope of Foreknowledge

Every aspect of the future is included in the exhaustive scope of God’s foreknowledge, for biblical evidence and theological reasoning both show his knowledge is infinite (Ps 147:5).

God’s knowledge of all things. Throughout the Bible, God’s knowledge is repeatedly extended to everything in existence: God himself (Matt 11:27; 1 Cor 2:10), every minor detail of his creation (Matt 6:8; 10:30), human thoughts and hearts (Ps 139:2; Heb 4:12–13), and human words and actions (Ps 139:4; Prov 5:21). As 1 John 3:20 summarizes, “he knows everything.”

God’s knowledge of the future. God not only knows everything past and present, but everything in the future as well. Bruce Ware rightly argues the “richest and strongest portion of Scripture supporting God’s knowledge of the future is Isaiah 40–48.”[24] Nine times in the section, God explains his infallible and infinite knowledge of the future distinguishes him from false gods (41:21–29; 42:8–9; 43:8–13; 44:6–8; 44:24–28; 45:20–23; 46:8–11; 48:3–8; 48:14–16). This is repeated and demonstrated throughout Scripture. For example, God knows of a future execution (Gen 40), a coming famine (Gen 41), the fall of a kingdom (Dan 5), and return of Israel (Dan 9).

God’s knowledge of future human decisions. Contrary to Richard Rice, the above examples clearly involve future human decisions.[25] However, knowledge of future decisions is also evident in countless other cases: Joseph’s brothers (Gen 50:19–20), Judas, the disciples and Peter (John 6:64; Matt 26), and the crucifixion (Mark 8:31; Acts 2:23; 4:27–28). Such texts state that God knows of specific decisions. However, given general statements of his knowledge (Heb 4:12–13; 1 John 3:20), we can logically also conclude that God knows all future decisions.

The future is knowable. Given at least some free decisions are foreknown by God, as Boyd admits from the texts above,[26] then such decisions are by implication knowable. If God can foreknow a single free decision, there is no logical reason why God cannot know them all.

God’s knowledge is infallible. Rice has suggested that prophetic texts simply record “God’s intention to do certain things in human history.”[27] However, this does not go far enough. In such texts, God not only declares what he intends, but what he will do.[28] Such prophecies are not probable predictions, but declarations of an inerrant and infallible God (Deut 18:22). In this way, open knowledge causes significant damage to the inerrancy and infallibility of Scripture.[29]

The doctrine of God. As John Frame argues, and Pinnock openly accepts, excluding part of the future from omniscience means that you must also modify several other aspects of the doctrine of God, including immutability, aseity, eternality, and impassibility.[30] These doctrines are supported by extensive biblical evidence and centuries of theological reasoning. As a result, each of these doctrines provide a compelling argument for holding to exhaustive knowledge.[31]

(2) The Source of Foreknowledge

Arminians and Molinists argue that free will and middle knowledge are the causes of divine foreknowledge. However, the Reformed view is that God’s foreknowledge is exhaustive because it comes God from himself. God comprehends the future because he controls the future.

God is sovereign. The Boethian idea of God as “spectator” has been popular since the sixth century. Based on it, God’s knowledge of the future has been likened to our knowledge of the past.[32] However, God is not like us, and his knowledge is not like ours. All things are decreed by God (Dan 4:35; Eph 1:11), including where we live (Acts 17:26; 18:21; Rom 1:10) and when we die (Acts 21:14; Jas 4:15; 1 Pet 3:17).[33] As Matthew Barrett states, “He is no spectator. He is the Creator, the one who determines all things.”[34] Isaiah 46:9–10 does not teach God cognitively knows “things not yet done,” but that he determines a plan for all of history and accomplishes it.

God controls free future decisions. This sovereign control includes determining the free decisions of humans (Gen 50:19–20; Acts 2:23; Eph 2:10; Phil 2:13). God not only knows what humans will freely choose in the future, but he controls what they will choose according to his perfect plan. As discussed below, this aligns with a compatibilist understanding of free will.

God’s knowledge is power. Simplicity means God’s power and knowledge cannot be divided. As Barrett explains, “God is omnisciently omnipotent and omnipotently omniscient, so when he “thinks,” things happen. His knowledge is causal, not just contemplative, like ours.”[35]

God knows his will. Simplicity also means we can distinguish God’s power from his knowledge. Therefore, it is not strictly true to say that God’s omniscience causes the future, for his omnipotent will does this. However, God must know the future, for he knows his own will.[36] Stephen Charnock reasons, “God’s perfect knowledge of himself, of his own infinite power and concluding will, necessarily includes a foreknowledge of what he is able to do and what he will do.”[37] Therefore, God does not know the future because he observes it, but because he ordains it.

God is independent. God himself must be the cause of this foreknowledge, as divine aseity means he only depends on himself. As Herman Bavinck demonstrates, in Molinism and Arminianism, God depends on the world, as he “derives knowledge from the world that he did not have and could not obtain from himself.”[38] In contrast, divine aseity means that both free and necessary knowledge must come from God himself. God is independent and self-existent, no one can teach him or give him understanding (Job 38–41; Is 40:14). As a result, we can conclude that God’s knowledge of his own power causes his necessary knowledge, and knowledge of his own will causes his free knowledge. As Charnock eloquently summarizes, just “as God sees things possible in the glass of his own power, so he sees things future in the glass of his own will.”[39]

Two Key Objections

This paper now briefly addresses the two strongest objections commonly made against this Reformed view of exhaustive foreknowledge: (1) human freedom, and (2) divine flexibility.

(1) Human Freedom

As outlined above, the other three views were all developed to protect human freedom in response to the Reformed position. They are all committed to a libertarian concept of freedom, defining free will as “the ability to choose otherwise.”[40] Arminius held this as a reason to adopt the idea of cognitive knowledge.[41] Similarly, without libertarian free will, middle knowledge is indistinguishable from necessary knowledge.[42] This was also the reason that Pinnock recovered open knowledge, which he argues is the only view entirely consistent with libertarian freedom.[43]

The Reformed view is based on a different understanding of human freedom. It holds to compatibilism, which defines freedom as “the ability to do what one wants.”[44] As Paul Helm explains, humans “are free to do as they want and are morally responsible for their choices. But all their choices nevertheless fall within the sovereign plan of God, which governs all things.”[45]

A compatibilist view best reflects the teaching of Scripture on human freedom. For example, in Luke 6:45, Jesus clearly teaches human decisions directly depend on their desires. [46] This understanding is also the only approach that can account for God’s sovereign control of free human decisions, which was established above (Gen 50:19–20; Acts 2:23; Eph 2:10; Phil 2:13).

Libertarian free will is not compatible with this biblical scope of divine sovereignty. Further, it cannot account for key theological concepts, including the impeccability of Christ, the inerrancy of biblical authors (2 Pet 1:21), and a sinless glorified state (1 John 3:2). For example, the inability of Christ to sin, biblical authors to err, and Christians to sin in glory surely must not exclude their free will. Exchanging libertarianism for compatibilism, which has stronger biblical and theological support, instantly removes the main objection to exhaustive foreknowledge.

(2) Divine Flexibility

Scripture sometimes describes God using dynamic language, such as surprise (Isa 5:4), testing (Gen 22:12), conditional possibility (Exod 4:8; Matt 26:39), change of mind (Exod 32:14) and regret (Gen 6:6; 1 Sam 15:10).[47]Building on this biblical motif of divine flexibility, open theism argues such dynamic language represents a relationship of responsive love. For if God’s interactions with human beings are to be genuine in integrity and sensitivity, Rice insists that he must change by reacting to creation, growing in his knowledge by learning about the future.[48]

It is clear there is also a strong and often repeated biblical motif of divine immutability (Num 23:19; 1 Sam 15:29; Ps 33:11; Mal 3:6; Jas 1:17). One of these two motifs must be given interpretive priority. Flexibility must be interpreted in light of immutability, or immutability in light of flexibility. No satisfactory way to achieve the latter has been proposed, as passages on divine immutability are absolute in asserting that God cannot change. Further, rejecting divine immutability is not an insignificant step to take. Indeed, Bavinck summarizes, “If God were not immutable, he would not be God.”[49] It would also have significant logical implications for other aspects of the doctrine of God, not only divine omniscience, but also God’s infinity and aseity.[50]

As all language about God is analogical, and can contain anthropomorphisms, it is far easier to interpret a motif of flexibility in light of divine impassibility.[51] Theologians throughout history have interpreted such passages as recording changes in our relationship with God, rather than in God himself.[52] It is generally reasoned these “affections are manifestations at various points in time of God’s eternal, immutable will, not a shifting pattern of oscillation or alteration in God himself.”[53] As a result, they are compatible with a Reformed view of foreknowledge.

Conclusion

This paper considered the nature of divine foreknowledge of free human actions. By assessing historic views from a biblical and theological perspective, it has demonstrated that the Reformed view is the best position. God’s knowledge comprehends free future actions because he controls them. This small insight into the depth of divine omniscience is a source of wonder and worship. For we can still declare, “Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!” (Rom 11:33)

[1] Paul Helm, “The Augustinian-Calvinist View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 173. Similarly, Thomas Oden defines it as “infinite consciousness of all possible objects of knowledge.” Thomas C. Oden, Classic Christianity: A Systematic Theology (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 48. See also the similar definitions of Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology: Revelation and God, vol. 1 (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2021), 725. Stephen Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, ed. Mark Jones, vol. 1. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2022), 1:615.

[2] Cottrell, Jack W, “Conditional Election,” in Grace for All: The Arminian Dynamics of Salvation, ed. Clark H. Pinnock and John D. Wagner (Eugene, OR: Resource Publications, 2015), 78.

[3] Cottrell, “Conditional Election,” 91.

[4] Matthew J. Pinson, “Jacobus Arminius: Reformed and Always Reforming,” in Pinnock and Wagner Grace for All, 161. This reasoning continues the tradition that began with Origen. See Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 2:197.

[5] Oden, Classic Christianity, 49.

[6] David Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” in Beilby and Eddy, Divine Foreknowledge, 88.

[7] Cottrell, “Conditional Election,” 77.

[8] Pinson, “Jacobus Arminius: Reformed and Always Reforming,” 159.

[9] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 726.

[10] William L. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, a Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1995), 147.

[11] William L. Craig, The Only Wise God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987), 127.

[12] William L. Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” in Beilby and Eddy, Divine Foreknowledge, 122.

[13] Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 125.

[14] Gregory Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” in Beilby and Eddy, Divine Foreknowledge, 42.

[15] Richard Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” in Pinnock, The Grace of God and the Will of Man, 129.

[16] Clark H. Pinnock, “Systematic Theology,” in The Openness of God (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1994), 123.

[17] Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” 128. Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” 42–43.

[18] Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” 47.

[19] Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” 132–34.

[20] Richard Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” in The Openness of God, 15.

[21] John M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2001), 33.

[22] Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:197. Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, 1:647.

[23] Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, 1:615.

[24] Bruce A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: A Critique of Open Theism (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000), 104.

[25] Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” 51.

[26] Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” 21.

[27] Rice, “Divine Foreknowledge and Free-Will Theism,” 135.

[28] Ware, God’s Lesser Glory, 132.

[29] Stephen J. Wellum, “The Inerrancy of Scripture,” in Beyond the Bounds, ed. John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2003), 253.

[30] Frame, No Other God, 161–90. Pinnock, “Systematic Theology,” 117–121.

[31] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 723.

[32] Hunt, “The Simple-Foreknowledge View,” 88.

[33] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 750.

[34] Matthew Barrett, None Greater: The Undomesticated Attributes of God. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2019), 192.

[35] Barrett, None Greater, 192.

[36] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 783. Contrary to Barrett, None Greater, 192.

[37] Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, 1:645.

[38] Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:201.

[39] Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, 1:650.

[40] Pinson, “Jacobus Arminius: Reformed and Always Reforming,” 160.

[41] Pinson, “Jacobus Arminius: Reformed and Always Reforming,” 158–59.

[42] Craig, “Middle Knowledge, a Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?” 147-48. The difference between necessary and middle knowledge is the latter depends on libertarian freedom. The distinction disappears without it.

[43] Clark H. Pinnock, “From Augustine to Arminius: A Pilgrimage in Theology,” in The Grace of God and the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock, (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1995), 25.

[44] Pinson, “Jacobus Arminius: Reformed and Always Reforming,” 160.

[45] Helm, “The Augustinian-Calvinist View,” 11.

[46] Frame, No Other God, 131.

[47] Boyd, “The Open-Theism View,” 23–37.

[48] Rice, “Biblical Support for a New Perspective,” 57–58.

[49] Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:154.

[50] Frame, No Other God, 161–90. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:158–59.

[51] For a detailed interpretation of each divine flexibility text, see Ware, God’s Lesser Glory, 65–99.

[52] Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, 1:508. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:158–59.

[53] Beeke and Smalley, Reformed Systematic Theology, 706.